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the computation.Wage differentials have been a topicof interest to economists for
many years. Analyses havebeen conducted with respect to skilland industry
differentials,1 union differentials,2 and more recently black—whitediffer—
•entials.3 Virtually all of these studies are cross—sectional in natureand,
as such, r'inewagedifferences as viewed at a point in time.More recent
laboreconomics literature has focused on theimportance of wealth ratherthan
income,andmorespecifically on the conscious decisionsthat individuals
makewhichalter the nature of their earningsstream.4 Thus, we do not view
two individuals with the same currentmeasured incomes as having the same real
incomesifone is on a job track that will yieldhim$50,000 per year at age
30 and the other is on a profile that yieldshim $10,000 per year at that
same age. Individuals are clearlynot indifferent between varying ratesof
wage growth. In fact, onemaycalculatethe value of differential wagegrowth
by determining the amount bywhich wealth is altered as theresult of the dif-
ferential. If jobs offer differing wagegrowth opportunitieS thecorji:'ensatiOfl
for those jobs should be measuredin a way that includes thisunobserved (at
a point in time) compensation.
Thisdistinction is especially importantwith respect to black—white
wage differentialssince whites enjoy more rapid wagegrowth than do blacks.
In particulars Welch (1973)has argued that black schoolingquality has
goneupover the 1960's and thatthis has resulted juan increasein the
black/whiteearnings ratio. Freeman(1975) suggests that thenarrowing
was the result of theincreased role of blacks in thepolitical process
which resulted in institutionalchanges causing blacks' wagesto rise.
Thestudies use wage rate-s orannual earnings of the individualsto examine
differentials. But particularly for young workers,ignoring the human capital
or wage growth component of earnings mayseriously disguise wage differentials
andtrendsin them. For example, suppose that governmentallegislation made—2—
it increasingly difficult to discriminate in the form of differentialpecuniary
wages. Employers would raise the observed wage for blacks while at the same
time decreasing the unobserved (or more difficult to observe) humancapital
component and thereby keep the true differential constant. Since most govern-
ment programs concentrate on entry level job discrimination, and since differen-
tial on—the—job training does not show up until later, examinIng thepecuniary
wage rate for young workers may greatly distort the true wealth differential.
Indeed, almost any conceivable model of optimal law evasion wouldsuggest that
employers would respond to legislation requiring equal pecuniary wage rates
across non—whites and whites at least in part by altering non—pecuniary aspects
of the wage. On—the—job training is, at least foryoung workers, a large part
of the non—pecuniary component. Both Welch and Freeman would miss thisby
their techniques. Indeed, this may help explain why Freeman finds a narrowing
of the differential for young workers that is absent among older cohorts.
Since older workers have flatter profiles, there is less room to take back in
wage growth what has been given in pecuniary wage levels. Employer resistance to
elimination of pecuniary differentials is likely to be greater with respect to
older workers.
This paper will employ a method (devised in Lazear (1976) )toestimate
the unobserved component of wages. The size of this component will be calculated
for non—whites and whites separately and then compared. Since, as it turns out,
the component is larger for whites than non—whites, observed wage differentials
understate true differentials. Furthermore, comparison of the period between
1966—1969 with the 1972—1974 period reveals that this unobserved differential
Increased substantially over time. The results of this study suggest that
although the pecuniary non-white —whitedifferential has narrowed substantially
between 1966 and 1974 for young men, the on—the—job training differential has
Increased by almost the exact same amount. This implies that in real wealth—3—
termsthere hasnotbeen any narrowing of the differential at all. This will
become more apparent in later years as those non—whites who werehired into
skilled jobs today fail to be promoted or obtain higher paying jobselsewhere
at the same rate as their white counterparts.
I. ANodel
Consideranindividual who hasan observedearningsstream, f(t) .His
true. earnings stream may be written as 1(t) where 1(t) includesthe
value of han capital paid to him. The value of the unobserved human capital
payment is then defined as H(t)1(t) —f(t).Whenone invests in
on—the—job training, thepotential earnings of that individual willgrow
overtIme. 1(t)does not measurethe potential earnings, but will necessarily
beat least as large as potential earnings. The reason is as follows: Let
potential earnings, i.e., the amount thatthe individual would receive in the
absence of investment inon—the—job training be written as $(t) .Ifan
individualundertakes investment in on—the—job in period t,thecost of that
investment is c(t)$(t)—f(t).Thevalue of that investment, H(t) is
equal to the present value of the amount by which potential earnings are




whereT is the age of retirement. But H(t)is the return to the total
investment in period tand totalreturn necessarily is greater than or
equaltototal cost.5That is, investment in humancapitalcanyieldinfra—
marginalprofits. The individual pushes the rateof investment in any period
to the point where the cost of increas.ngthat rate exactly equals the returns •—4—
On the last increment of rate increase no profits are earned, but they are
earned on all inframargina]. increases. Thus, lifetime wealth is increased by
JTtH(t)—C(t)]etdt as the result of investment in on—the—job training.
It is f(t) + H(t) that is received by the individual, however, and this is
th'3 amountthatconstitutes real earnings. If one could observe q(t),eq.CL)
would allow H(t) and therefore f(t) + H(t) to be determined. Butonly
f(t) can be observed. However, although +(t)f(t) ,undercertain cir—
cuinstances +'(t) V (t).. Since f' (t) can be observed, true earnings could
be ascertained under these conditions.




so that if C'(t) equals zero, f'(t) —'(t).If investment in on—the—job
training is approximately constant over time, then f'(t) will approximate
4'(t).Thus,using f'(t) for




Now the point addressed in the introduction can be discussed more
igorously. Cross—sectional analyses of wage differentials only consider
differences in the observed values of f(t) at some point in time. Yet
eq.(4)reveals that this only tells part of the story.Atrue measure of
thewagedifferent.ia.1. is P(t) —
FNW(t)where NW and W refer to non-
whites and whites, respectively. Since it is likely7 that H.(t) >H(t)
,
thewage differential will be understated by f(t) —
LNW(t)
.In.addition,
it may well be that trends in true differentials are dominated by changes in—5—
L(t)
—L(t)
over time so that examination of observed wagesobscures the
truepicture.
Empirical verification of the propositionsoutlined above may be obtained.
Following the method described in Lazear (1976), a wagegrowth equation can
be estimated so that one can ascertain f(t) and f'(t) .Oncethat is done
it isa simple matter to estimate "true" wages bythe approximation of F(t)
given in eq. (4).
II. Estimation.
Theory8ande.mpiricalevidence tell us that investment in human capital,
in the form of forxnai. schooling and on—the—job training, is larger for
younger individuals than itisfor older ones. Age—earnings profiles are
generally observed to be steeper in the early part of life so that f'(t)
isa decreasing function of(t) .Thereforedifferences between measured
wages and "true" wages are likely to be greatest during the first years of
workexperience. For this reason, the two data sets to be used provide
information exclusively on young individuals. The 1966—1969 period is
analyzed with the use of the National Longitudinal Survey on Young Hen,
14—24 years of age in 1966. The 1972—1974 period makes use of the National
Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of l92. The first part of
this section will be devoted to examination of the 1966—1969 NLS. In the
second part we will compare results from this earlier period to those
obtained for the later 1972—1974 period.-6—
A.The National Longitudinal Survey, 1966—1969.
1. The basic equation.
This data set provides detailed information onschooling and work
experience. The fact that it is longitudinalallows one to determine more
precisely the nature and extent ofwork experience during the particular
period. The estimating equation usedthroughout this part of the analysis is:
(5) in V69 —inW668o+8i E66 + 82A66
+ 83(A}I)+84(S)+5(ST)
+ + + 88(U69)(E)
+
89M66+ + 811S66+B12S66(iE) + 13D(tE)
where
266 Is yearsof work experience by 1966,
V69 is the hourly wage rate in cents in 1969,
W66 is the hourly wage rate in cents in 1966,
A66 is the individual's age in 1966,
AR is the change in 'usual"hoursworked between 1966 and 1969,
AS is the change in the highest grade of formal schooling completed
between 1966 and 1969,
ASTis the difference between a dummy set equal to 1 if the individual
was attending school in 1969 and a du=y similarly defined forl966,
AE is the number of weeks worked between 1966 and 1969 divided by 52
(i.e.,itis the proportionof years worked),
U69 is a dummysetequal to one if the individual was in a union in 1969,—7—
N66
is a dummysetequal to one if the individualwas marriedin 1966,
D is a dumnysetequal to one if the individual is white,
and
S66
is the highest grade of schooling completed in1966.
Observations were dropped for which no wage rate in either 1966 or 1969
was reported or for which informationwasincomplete. The motivation behind this
particular form is discussed in depth in Lazear (1976) andLazear(1976a) and
will not be examined here. Suffice it to say that the included variables are
those suggested by human capital theory which entered significantly into the
regression. Equation (5) mayberewritten as
(6) —
W66exp(çj +......+ 812566(AE))
andassuch is a genera]. form for a growthequation.Further, the specifica-
tionin (5) has theadvantage that it differences out unobservedability com-
ponents which affect wagesin both years. That is, it is equivalent to
allowingeach individual to have his own constant term in a wage levels
equation. This implies that the estimates obtained from (5) are not as likely
to be biased by omitted ability variables.
One point should be made. The t in equations (1) through (4) refers
to experience time rather than chronological time. That is the f'(t) that
is relevant is that wage growth which occurs as the result of job experience
per se. It is only this component of growth that can be couited as part of
the wage rate. Residual wage growth that occurs as one "ages" even in the
absence of job experience is not part of compensation received while on the—8—
Job andshouldnot be countedinthe total return. Thus,z(t) shOu.Ld De
rewrittenas
(7) =
f(E66,A66, H, E, LS, ST,
U69 M66 D, S66)
andf'(t)becomes since E equals E69 when E66 is defined
to be period zero. If wage growth takes the form expressed in eq. (6), then
a
(8) f'W66exp(0 + ....+813D(iE))(6 + + +
Equation(5) asestimated by OLS and the results are contained below:
















R=.185 (.03505) (.02650) (.07768)
SEE =.4324
—
.04477S66 N =2115 (.01779)
(standard errors are enclosed in parentheses.)
The interpretation of these coefficients is provided elsewhere [see Lazear (1976)1.
Basically, they suggest that positive changes in the stock of human capital
positively affect wage growth. Thus, the coefficient on tS (changes In the
stock of schooling) is positive and substantial. For the mean individual,—9—
(1.0)69W exp(8+....+ 8
—14.4
so that a one year increase in schooling between 1966 and 1969 is associated
with a 14 cent increase in wages in. 1969. Similarly, for the mean individual
(11) f'W66[exp(80 + ...+813D(tE))](86 + + +
—18.81
From (4), mean"actual"wages in 1966 can be estimated:
T-t








if r —.1and retirement occurs in the year 2011. (Thehours—worked-Per—Year
term enters both sides of the equationand therefore cancels.) Thus, observed
wages are only about 51 percentof actual wages where the latter includethe
valueofwage growth that results from job experience.The sheer magnitude of
thewagegrowth value for young men suggests that examinationof differences in
this number across individuals may be important. Therefore, the expressionis
evaluated for whites andnon—whitesseparately, taking the conditional mean


















The measured wage differential between white and non—white young men in 1966
was $2.14 —$1.56=$.58.Theestimate of the true wage differential, on
the other hand, is a much larger $423 —$2.84=$1.39.Even in relative
terms, the ratio of white to non—white observed wages is 1.37. The ratio
of white to non—white true wages is 1.48. Thus, neglecting the value of
different experience—earnings profiles between whites and non—whites leads to
serious understatement of true wage differntia1s.—11—
Even the above calculation is likely to understate the true differential
for two reasons, both of which have to do with differences in labor force
behavior between whites and non—whites. First, since whites are less likely
to suffer unemployment than are non—whites and since they typically retire at
a later date° the time period over which (12), (14), and (16) are integrated
should be longer for whites. Thus, the assumption that T —t45 for all
individuals is likely to cause the estimate of the value of wage growth for
whites relative to non—whites to be understated.
Second, since in any given year a white worker is more likely to be
employed than a non—white worker (once he begins full—time participation
in the labor force) (t)I1andF(t)10mightreasonably be weighted by
the probability of obtaining that wage.This, however, to be conceptually
correct, requires a great deal of information on the value of leisure. If
theworld were inequilibrium, the marginal value of a minutespentin leisure
must equal the marginal value of a minute of employment; i.e., on the margin
the value of leisure equals the wage rate. However, as changes in time worked
come in discrete blocks, the value of leisure of that discrete block.
of time must necessarily be smaller thanearnings. (This is simply the
resultof the diminishing marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
goods as leisure increases). The amount by whIch it is smaller depends upon
the utility function itself. Without information on the parameters of that
function it is impossible to choose correct weights for white vs. non—white
wages. This notwithstanding, the estimates of wage differentials obtained
above are lower bounds to the true differentials since both of those labor
force participation effects work in the direction of increasing the true
differential.—12—
2. Decomposition of wage growth
It is useful to consider the individual components of the unobserved wage
w69 differential. From (11), it is clear that differences in between whites
andnon—whitesresult either from differences in the average wage levels across
groups (i.e.,W66[exp(80+ ....+ W69) or from differences in the
effect of experience itself on growth rates (i.e., 86+ 88TJ69+
312S66+ 13D)
it turns out, the most important determinant of differences in wage growth is
the grade of schooling completed, S66 .This variable operates in three ways.
First, it causes there to be differences in the initial wage level, W66, since
is itself dependent upon schooling level. Second, changes in S66 affect
the difference between and since W69 W66 exp (Bo+.. .+811S66+812S6E
+ 813D(E)). Third, differences inS66 affect the degree to which job
experience affects wage growth since S66 interacts with LE in thewage
growth equation. Let us consider each in turn.
One cannot infer directly the effect of schooling on the wage level in 1966 from
eq. (9). However, elsewhere (Lazear [19761) an analogous wage level equation










If non—whites, whose mean level of s66 is 10.988 years had the whitest





—l69per hour rather than 156 per hour.
Second, by substituting 11.464 as opposed to 10.088 in
exp(B + •••+8l31,
one obtains that exp(80 + +813D(AEY) 1.547 rather than 1.551. (The
negative effect of increased schooling through 811 exceeds the positive
effect of 812E .)
Third, and most important, is that the effect of job experience itself
depends upon schooling level. Adjusting this for the higher level of
schooling yields (86 + 88U69 + 812S66) =.0795as opposed to .0537 ith
S66 —10.088. Thus, if non-whites had the same ].evei. of schooling as whites,
(18):69 —66l0)E!x8O
+ ......... + 8l3D(E)I]
10, 5661 464







correcting for differencies in the initial level of schooling removesabout
96 of the differential experience effect. In terms of true wage rates, it






Since the average white's true wages were estimated to be $4.23 ,thiscuts the
true wage differential from the estimated l39Q to 49. per hour.
Another term that interacts with E is a dummy for union membership.
Although the effect of this variable is sizeable, the probability of being
in a union did not differ between the whites and non—whites in this sample.
ofnon—whites,.246 had U69 =1.For whites, the proportion was .243.
It should be noted that the coefficient on D(E) for this early period
is close to zero. The differential experience—induced wage growth between
whites and non—whites during this early period is the result of differences
In initial conditions. This is not the case in the later period analyzed
below. There, the coefficient a D(EXE) is large and positive. Other things
constant, whites enjoy larger experience—induced wage growth than do non-
whites in 1972—1974 although this is not true during the early period.—15—
Afinalpointon white—non—white differences in wage growth are in order.
Despite all that has been said above, it is not the case that during 1966—1969








This difference is reflected in the coefficient on D which is negative,
although insignificant. This is quite consistent with the scenario out-
lined above. If firms have responded to government pressure to reduce white —
non—whitewage differentials by reducing the wage growth component for non—
ybites relative to whites, initial observed wages will rise relatively for
non—whites. That is, since the group in question consists of young men who
are predominantly at entry level jobs, pecuniary wages of non—whites will
rise on these jobs at a more rapid rate for non—whites than whites. This
is reflected in the negative coefficient on D. Yet once those initial jobs
are obtained, non—whites' experience will have a differential effect on wage
growth than whites' experience. Inthisearly period, the differential
effectappears to be the result of differences in initial conditions. In
the later period to be analyzed below, the differential experience induced
wage growth occurs even inthe absence of differing initial conditions.—16—
3. Some details
In this section, the validity of assumptions made initially are tested
empirically. Eq. (3) states that if C'(t) =0,4(t) f'(t) .Thequestion
then becomes how small must cbein order for c(t + c)— c(t)to be approximately
zero. In this study, a three year time span was chosen in order to obtain suffi—
dent variation in right—hand variables. The minimum time span for which data
are present is c= 1year. If c(t + c)< c(t),this implies that f"(t) <0.
Thus, an estimate of f'(t) based on (f(t + 3) —f(t)]/3will be smaller than
f(t + )— f(t).In order to see that estimates of e'(t) are insensitive to
the choice of c, tworegressions were run identical to eq. (9) except that
all variables with 1969 subscripts were replaced first with their 1968 values
and then with their 1967 values.
The question then is, do the coefficients of primary interest with
respect to f', namely 86 8' 8I2 and l3' differ significantly across years.
To test this, theestimates of these coefficients obtained from eq. (9) were
jnserted into the 1966—68 and 1966—67 equations. Then after constraining the
coefficients to take on these values, the regressions were rerun and the
sumofsquared residuals were compared to those obtained in the unconstrained
versions. For 1966—68, it was found that F(4,904)1.030. For 1966—67,
the corresponding value was F(4,693).410. In neither case do 6'8' l2'
anid l3 taken jointly differ significantly from those obtained from the 1966—
69 regression. The conclusion is that the choice of 3 years yields a
value of f' which is a good approximation for '.
Asecond way to define is in terms of life—cycle rather than
chronological time.Inorder to test the sensitivity of f'to differences
in life—cycle time, an (Age)(E) interaction term was added to Eq. (9).
The coefficient on this variable was insignificant so the assumption that,
for these ages, f' is invariant with respect to age, is borne out.
12—17—
Given that some of these individuals are currently enrolled in school,
it is interesting to perform the analysis on non—students. Eq. (5) was
therefore rerun, deleting the S and ST terms on the non—student subsample.
This reduced the number of observations to 1021 and standard errors increased
as expected. However, the primary findings remained the same: (l966) 'Dl =$4.46
while F(1966) 'D $1.94, yielding a true differential of $2.52. The observed
wage rates were f(1966)IDl —$2.65and f(1966)ID...0 =$1.74so that the
observed differential was 9l per hour.
B. The NLS High School Class of 1972:
1. Estimation
In this section, longitudinal data from the National Longitudinal
Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLSHS) will be used to estimate
the unobserved on—the—job training component of earnings during this
later period. This sample, although similar to the NLS for 1966—1969,
has some important differences. The major difference is that all indivi-
duals in this sample were enrolled in twelfth grade in 1972 so no early
high school drop—outs are contained. This also implies that the age
distribution of respondents is much more tightly centered around the
mean age in 1972 than was the 1966—1969 sample (although the difference
in mean ages is not that substantial). Furthermore, there is virtually
no variation in initial schooling levels during October, 1972, the date
of the initial wage rate. These differences imply slight differences in
the forms of the wage growth equation (obvious ones are deletion of
initialschooling and age variables), but the basic form is the same.
The NLSHS is a national probability sample of about 22,000 high
school seniors. A survey was taken during the Spring of 1972 and two
follow—upswere conducted in October of 1973 and 1974. For the purposes
of this analysis, a sub—sample of males who had wage rates reported and-18-
whosuppliedcomplete information on the other relevant variables was
s2lected. (2393 individuals fit this category.) The basic estimating
equation for this period was:
(20) in W74 —inW72 =lo
+Ii(E72) + 2 (LH)
+ 13 IXS + 14 (tST) +15(LE)
+ 16 ' (EE) + 17 (M74) + D
+ 19 (D) (E)
where:
is the hourly wage rate in October 1974 in dollars,
is the hourly wage rate in October 1972 in dollars,
E72
is the amountofpreviouswork experience in October, 1972,
LH is hours per week on the October 1974 job minus hours per
week on the October 1972 job,
tS is the grade level completed in 1974 minus twelve,
tSTis a dummy equal to one if the individual attended school
in 1974 minus a similar dummy for 1972,
E is the number of weeks worked between October 1972 and October
1974 divided by 52,
1174
is a dummy equal to one if the individual is married in 1974
and
D is a dummy equal to one for whites.






D (SE))(15 + 16 LS + 19)
and for non—whites,
(22) f'(t)IDo :4IDO W72 exp
...+
17 M74) (15 + ES).—19—
Equation (20) was estimated by OLS and the results were:





+ .23748 S —.07803(tST)
(.08603) (.02346)









Makingthesame assumptions as were made in eq. (12), we can estimate the







(25) P:(1972)I0 =f(1972)IDO+ 34.1 fe dt
255+337
592C/hour
What is important to note is that although there was virtually no wage differential
observed (whites earned on average $2.57/hour while non—whites earned $2.55 in 1972),
the on—the—job training differential was substantial: It equalled $5.97 —$3.37
or $2.60 per hour. In real terms, the true differential in 1966 ($1.39 per hour)
inflated for six years at a rate of 6% is equal to $1.99 per hour. Thus, there—20—
is, if anything, an increase in the true differential for 1972. The major
distinction is that the pecuniary differential narrowed substantially while
the unobserved on—the—job training differential expended by a greater amount.
This may be a response to government pressure to reduce pecuniary wage differen-
tials.
It should be noted that in this equation the coefficient on D(E) is
positive and relatively large (although its standard error is also quite
large). This was not the case during the first period analyzed. There it
appeared that, initial conditions the same, experience—induced wage growth
was not larger for whites than for non—whites. The difference there arose
from differences in mean initial conditions. Here, even holding all else
constant (including initial wage), the experience induced wage growth is
larger for whites than for non—whites. The difference of the coefficients
on D(tE) between 1966 and 1972 is equal to .0950 with a standard error of
.0694. Thus, although there is a somewhat large standard error, there
appears to be some evidence for a change in the coefficient on D(E) over
time, as well as evidence for changes in the difference —
AE D=1 D0
2. Some useful comparisons
Before reaching the firm conclusion that whatever narrowing of the pecuniary
ditferential has occurred has been offset by increases in the OJT differential,
some points should be made.
First, it is important to note that 1966—1969 was a period of rapid
economic activity while 1972—1974 was a recession. (The unemployment rate for
white males 16 years of age and older averaged 2.6% between 1966—1969 and
4.2% between 1972 and 1974.) This has major implications for the estimates
obtained.—21—
Note, for example, that the coefficient on initial experience(E66 and
E )bouncesfrom negative to positive. The negative coefficient on E is
explained elsewhere (see Lazear 1976) as reflecting the fact that OJTis
acquired during the first years at work. The positive coefficient on
E72
is likely to capture the fact that given initial wage rates, more senior
workers are less affected by recessions than are their more juniorcounterparts.
If this is the explanation, the effect is sufficient to offset thetendency to
invest more during early years. Similarly, DII had a positive sign in the
1966—69 regression, but a negative, one later. The reversalmay be due to
simultaneity bias brought on by recessionary changes. If the recession lovers
the wages of some workers, in the short run theymay increase their hours worked.
This finding has shown up in past work.13 Thus, thenegative coefficient or 1ii
might reflect the fact that those individuals who experience relative
declines in wages also iicrease their hours worked during recessions.
(. Anotherdifference across periods which may result from differences
in business activity relates to the levels of the on—the—job training com-
ponent. The absolute magnitude of this compensation is much larger
between 1972 and 1974 than it was in the earlier period. There are at
least two possible explanations. First, along the lines of Butler and
Heckman (1976), the differential attractiveness of welfare payments to
low v. high income individuals will tend to cause only the most able workers
to remain. This is especially the case during recessions (since more drop
below the point at which this alternative source of income is acceptable)
so that the 1972—1974 sample of individuals who are working is of higher
average ability than the sample of workers during 1966—1969. (They are
also more able in that they all have attended school through grade twelve.)
If, as is likely to be the case, the more able invest more in on—the—job—22—
taining, this would show up as a higher OJT componrtt for the mean working
individual between 1972 and 1974. Second, I have argued elsewhere, (Lazear
(1974) ),thatit is rational to acquire OJT to a greater extent during
recessions than during expansions. If so, the difference between the
two periods would be a manifestation of this phenomenon.
The point raised by Butler and Heckman (1976) has other implications
for this analysis. For example, it helps explain the total disappearance
of a pecuniary wage differential y 1972. Since non—whites are more likely
to be pulled out of the labor force by alternative welfare payments, those
who remain will be of higher average quality than the working whites. This
would result in a narrowing of the differential. It cannot, however, account
for the finding of this paper that the non—whites' gains in pecuniary wages
were offset by losses in OJT compensation. In fact, the effect works in
the opposite direction. Since during recessions, non—white males exit
the employment force to a larger extent than do whites, the 1972—1974
period has relatively high quality non—'hites. Since they are the indi-
viduals most likely to invest in OJT, the white—non—white OJT differential
would narrow between 1966 and 1972 on this score. It does not. Selectivity
effects are not sufficiently large to disguise the substitution from
pecuniary differentials to OJT differentials.
The fact that pecuniary wage differentials have narrowed to a greater
extent for the highly educated can be explained by these findings. Since
education and OJT were found to be complementary, highly educated non—whites
had a larger OJT component in 1966 than did the less educated. If, say,
the same proportion of OJT was reduced for all non—whites, pecuniary wages
would rise by more in absolute terms for the highly educated. This would
imply a greater narrowing of the differential for this group. Note that
the narrowing of wage differentials to a larger extent for educated groups—23—
is inconsistent with Butler and Heckman (1976). This explanation reconciles
thair story with the observed result since true differentials do not seem
to have narrowed at all.
A final point is that the R2 on the 1972—1974 regression is considerably
lower than the for 1966—1969. The later data set deals with a much more
homogeneous group than the former. (There is no variation in initial schooling
and very little in age and previous experience.) Thus, regressions on the
NLSHS are asked to perform a much more difficult task than are those on the
original NLS.
3. More details
In this section, some of the points considered for the 1966—1969 analysis
are examined for the 1972—1974 period.
First, the 1972—1974 regression was performed for the non—student sub-
sample. Again tS, ST, and (LS)(E) were deleted. Standard errors increased,
but the coefficient on D(E) was still positive and substantial at .09002
— — (.07988)
Furthermore, F(1972)IDl =$10.06and F(1972) =$6.46yielding a true
differential of $3.60 per hour. The observed differential was only $2.64 —
$2.56or 7 per hour. It should also be noted that the $2.52 differential
obtained for the non—student group in 1966, when inflated at six per cent
per year, becomes $3.61 in 1972 dollars. This compares quite favorably
to the estimated $3.60 differential for 1972.
Again, the test for an (Age)(E) interaction was performed. Neither
age, age(E), nor the two taken jointly entered significantly. Nor did
stratification of the sample into two separate groups on the basis of age
yield significantly different results.—24—
Summary and Conclusion:
This paper suggests that calculations of white —non—whitewage differentials
which are based on observed monetary wage rates understate true differentials
by a substantial amount. This is the result of differences in the steepness
of the age—earnings profiles across groups, the value of which should be
capitalized and added to current earnings. For young men, for whom the
effect is likely to be strongest, the normally measured wage differential was
found to be 58 per hour in 1966. The "true" differential, which includes
the capitalized value of wage growth, was two and one half times as large. For
1972, the observed differential was 2 per hour. The true differential was
$2.62 per hour. Even in terms of relative wage differentials the point
remains valid. The observed relative wage rate was 1.37 in 1966 and l.Ol
in 1972. The true relative wage rates were 1.48 in 1966 and 1.44 in 1972.
This implies a much smaller narrowing than appears from examination of
pecuniary wages.
The most important conclusion is that although white —non—whitepecuniary
wage differentials were eliminated between 1966 and 1972, the true differential,
which includes the value of on—the—job training, remained approximately the same.
This may reflect a national response on the part of employers to government
pressure to narrow pecuniary wage differentials, especially for young workers.
It was found that about 95 percent of the unobserved differential in
1966 could be eliminated by bringing the average level of non—whites' school-
ing, currently at 10.088 years, to that for whites, at 11.464 years. This
results primarily from the fact that on—the—job training seems to be comple-
mentary with level of schooling attainment so that, other things equal,
highly schooled individuals have steeper age—earnings profiles.
Finally, this paper has considered only one aspect of unobserved earnings,
namely payment In the form of humancapital.For young men, this is substantial,
amounting to as much as one—half of total earnings. Other unaccounted for remuner——25—
ation ay also have effects.Differences in non—pecuniarybenefits, taxes, ana
job security, also arelikely to enter. A more completeanalysis would bring
these differences in as well.FOOTNOTES
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1. See Reder (1955, 1963), Rosen (1970), Keat (1960).
2. See Lewis (1963), Rosen (1969), Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972).
3. See Smith and Welch (1975), Welch (1973), Freeman (1975, 1976).
4. This is exemplified by Ben—Porath (1967), Heclcnan (1975), Haley (1973),
and Liflard (1975).
5.SeeRosen (1973) or Lazear (1975) for a complete discussion of this
point. In the context of this paper, it means that
t
4(t)=[l(+ f H(T) dT)R
0
where is the initial stock of human capital and R is its rental rate.
So




C(t) and H(t) are not the same. In fact H(t) >C(t)or else no investment
occurs. C(t) is the amount of investment. 11(t) is its return. Only the
marginal unit of investment equals its marginal cost. Thus, in general
F(t) >6(t).
6.The goodness of approximation can be determined empirically. More will
be said on this below.
7.It is generally argued that age—earnings profiles are one steeper for
whites than non-whites.F2
8. See Becker (1975)
9. See Lazear (1976a) for the rationale behind this variable.
10. See Bowen and Finegan (1970)
11. Regressions estimated separately for whites and non—whites did not yield
significantly different sumofsquared residuals from the combined
regression.
12. Theory tells us that, at least over some range, C'(t) must be negative.
(This is because C(T) =0.)That we cannot reject the hypothesis that
C'(t)0 does not imply, of course, that its value is non—negative.
However, C'(1966)IDl is likely to be more negative than C'(1966)!D....Q
because initial levels of investment for whites are higher and both
C(T)ID1 and C(T) 'D 0 equal. zero. Thus, C'(1966)ID1 —C'(1966)
is likely to be very small indeed. Therefore, the amount by which
f'(1966)ID...1 —f'(l966)IDOoverstates 4'(1966)jDl —4'(1966)IDO
also likely to be small. The same argument applies for 1972 as well.
13. See Mincer (1962), for example.REFERENCES
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